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Do strong demographic faultlines breed opinion polarization in work teams? We integrate two theories that have beenused to explain faultline effects. The first, the approach of Lau andA2Murnighan [Lau DC, Murnighan JK (1998)
Demographic diversity and faultlines: The compositional dynamics of organizational groups. Acad. Management Rev.
23(2):325–340], suggests that in teams with strong faultlines the mechanisms of homophilious selection of interaction
partners and persuasive influence cause subgroup polarization, defined as the split of the team into subgroups holding
opposing opinions. The second, from sociological and anthropological traditions, emphasizes that crisscrossing actors bridge
faultlines because they share demographic attributes with several subgroups. Demographically crisscrossing actors help
to prevent polarization in social groups. We argue that Lau and Murnighan’s theory implicitly factors in the effects of
crisscrossing actors. However, we show that the authors overlooked crucial implications of their theory because they did
not consider crisscrossing actors explicitly. Most importantly, we demonstrate that demographic crisscrossing implies that
even teams with strong faultlines will overcome polarization in the long run, although they might suffer from it in the
short term. We develop and analyze a formal computational model of the opinion and network dynamics in work teams to
show the consistency of our reasoning with Lau and Murnighans’ theory. The model also revealed another counterintuitive
effect: strong faultlines lead to structures of interaction that make teams with strong faultlines faster in arriving at a stable
consensus than teams with weak faultlines.
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Introduction
Demographic diversity in the workplace is a major chal-
lenge for organizations and is becoming an increasingly
important issue as the economy globalizes (for com-
prehensive reviews about theoretical and empirical
research, see Bowers et al. 2000, Milliken and Martins
1996, Pelled 1996, Stewart 2006, van Knippenberg and
Schippers 2007, Webber and Donahue 2001, Williams
and O’Reilly 1998). For work teams, demographic diver-
sity can be beneficial, because it broadens the social
and human capital of the team. However, the benefits
do not accrue automatically. Demographic dissimilarity
between team members may, at the same time, cause
conflicts and tensions and thus threaten performance.
This leads Milliken and Martins to conclude in their
review of the field thatA3“diversity thus appears to be a
double-edged sword” (1996, p. 403).
In the search for conditions that explain why diver-
sity sometimes increases team performance and reduces
it at other times, Lau and Murnighan (1998, 2005) pro-
posed that the effects of diversity may decisively depend
on the way demographic attributes, like age and gen-
der, are distributed among team members. Their main
proposition is that diversity impairs team functioning
when the distribution of demographic attributes gen-
erates a strong faultline:A4“Group faultlines increase in
strength as more attributes are highly correlated, reduc-
ing the number and increasing the homogeneity of
resulting subgroups. In contrast, faultlines are weakest
when attributes are not aligned and multiple subgroups
can form” (Lau and Murnighan 1998, p. 328). They
argue that diversity (demographics not aligned) increases
the potential of a team for creativity and good perfor-
mance, but when the diversity is in a group with a strong
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faultline (demographics aligned), this potential may not
be realized. The team may split up into subgroups with
polarized opinions that cause conflicts between team
members (Bezrukova et al. 2009). An intriguing impli-
cation of the theory Lau and Murnighan (1998) is that
an ideal workgroup composition might exist such that
large pools of social and human capital can be obtained,
but the damaging effects of diversity on cohesion can be
avoided.
We contribute to the faultline research by elaborat-
ing the explanation of the faultline proposition (Lau and
Murnighan 1998) and thereby revealing crucial implica-
tions of faultline theory that have been overlooked so
far. We start by reviewing two parallel theoretical lines
that have been used to explain faultline effects and are
based on fundamentally different arguments. The first,
Lau and Murnighan’s (1998) theory, highlights that the
interplay of homophilious selection of interaction part-
ners with social influence breeds subgroup polarization
in work teams with strong faultlines. Subgroup polar-
ization is our main dependent variable and is defined as
the degree to which work team subgroups hold opposing
opinions on work-related issues. The second theoret-
ical line has been developed in classical sociological
and anthropological studies and focuses on the inte-
grating function of “crisscrossing actors” (Colson 1954,
Evans-Pritchard 1939, Flap 1988, Galtung 1966, Lijphart
1977, Nieuwbeerta and Flap 2000, Ross 1920, Simmel
A51908). Crisscrossing actors share at least one demo-
graphic attribute with another demographic subgroup
than their own and thus function as a bridge over the
subgroup split that was caused by the faultline.
Lau and Murnighan (1998) did not take into account
how demographically crisscrossing actors can reduce
subgroup polarization when the faultline is strong. Using
their assumptions, we show that although their theory
implicitly considers this, by not examining crisscrossing
actors, the authors did not see some crucial implications
of their theory. Foremost, we show that their theory pre-
dicts subgroup polarization only in the short term if the
team contains demographically crisscrossing actors. We
propose that in teams with a fixed composition, in the
long run, demographically crisscrossing actors help to
overcome subgroup polarization and group splits, even
in teams with very strong faultlines. Moreover, we show
that subgroup polarization in the short term depends on
two further conditions that Lau and Murnighan implic-
itly assumed but which they did not examine theoreti-
cally. First, strong faultlines entail subgroup polarization
in the short run only when employees exhibit sufficiently
strong homophily when selecting interaction partners.
That is, team members have a sufficiently strong pref-
erence for interacting with colleagues that are similar to
them on certain attributes (McPherson et al. 2001). Sec-
ond, we propose that demographic faultlines entail group
splits in the short run only when there is sufficient initial
congruency between work-related opinions and demo-
graphic attributes in the work team (Homan et al. 2007,
A6p. 82; Phillips 2003, p. 7; Phillips et al. 2004, p. 503).
In other words, we expect subgroup polarization only
when initial opinion differences overlap sufficiently with
the demographic faultline.
Faultline effects result from a complex interplay
of the interactions between multiple team members.
As Harrison et al. (2007) suggested, agent-based com-
putational modeling is a powerful method that allows
researchers to cope with theoretical complexity and to
reveal counterintuitive implications of a theory. Frank
and Fahrbach (1999) developed an agent-based model of
complex and interrelated network and opinion dynam-
ics in organizations, based on mechanisms that are very
similar to those we assume. We follow their lead and
use a formal modeling approach to show how Lau and
Murnighan’s reasoning, on the one hand, and the soci-
ological and anthropological theories on crisscrossing
actors, on the other hand, can be reconciled. We present
and analyze a computational model that is based on Lau
and Murnighan’s core assumptions and test whether the
propositions do consistently follow from their theory.
Our results support the proposition that faultline effects
occur only in the short run and that strong homophily
and initial congruency are crucial conditions for the
effect of faultlines on group polarization.
The analyses of our formal model also revealed a
counterintuitive effect of faultline strength. Even though
teams with a strong faultline tend to experience stronger
subgroup polarization, our results suggest that they
might be faster in arriving at a stable consensus once
opinions have converged. It turned out that weak fault-
line teams overcome initial opinion differences quickly,
but it also takes them longer to arrive at a stable con-
sensus as team members tend to challenge the emerging
consensus. This so-called “challenging process” (Lau
and Murnighan 1998, p. 332) is shorter in teams with
strong faultlines because these teams consist of sub-
groups that can quickly develop local consensus as a
result of their internal coherence. Crisscrossing actors
link these subgroups to each other such that opinion dif-
ferences between groups gradually converge while their
local coherence remains stable. Our analyses demon-
strate that this process generates a stable outcome more
quickly than the less structured consensus formation pro-
cess in teams with weak faultlines, in which a larger
number of mutual interactions between team members
from different subgroups is possible.
Two Explanations of Faultline Effects
Lau and Murnighan’s Explanation of
Faultline Effects
Lau and Murnighan (1998) argued that all newly formed
teams go through aA7“sensemaking process of understand-
ing each other and their task” (p. 332) to coordinate
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similar opinions about what their task is, how to ful-
fill it, and how to devise work. In this process, the inter-
play of two core mechanisms can cause problems in
teams with a strong faultline. First, Lau and Murnighan
assume homophilious selection of interaction partners.
Team members tend to associate with colleagues who
share relevant demographic attributes. This assumption
is prominently supported by a large body of sociological
research on homophily (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954)—
A8or the tendency of “birds of a feather flock together”—
that has consistently been identified as a strong force
in social interactions (McPherson et al. 2001). Studies
in both educational (e.g., Kandel 1978, Moody 2001)
and organizational settings (e.g., Bacharach et al. 2005,
Ibarra 1992, McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987, Ruef
et al. 2003) have provided empirical confirmation of the
homophily concept.
Homophilious selection of interaction partners implies
that faultline strength affects who is interacting with
whom in a team. To visualize this central point of Lau
and Murnighan’s theory, we constructed six hypothetical
teams with different faultline strengths. Each team con-
sists of 20 individuals, a team size that is not too big to
be unrealistic for a work team (Wegge et al. 2008) yet is
also large enough to allow for a sufficiently fine-grained
variation in the strength of demographic faultlines. Each
team member is described by three dichotomous demo-
graphic attributes (symbolized as black versus white,
A versus B, and rectangle versus circle). Diversity in
all teams and on all demographic dimensions is kept at
its maximum. That is, all three dichotomous variables
have a distribution in which both values of the attribute
are equally frequent (50:50). Teams differ, however, in
the strength of their demographic faultlines. Faultline
strength is denoted by the symbol f and is measured
here by the pairwise Pearson correlation between all
pairs of demographic attributes. Applying a method pro-
posed by Flache and Mäs (2008a, b), we varied faultline
strength between maximal (all pairwise Pearson correla-
tions are 1) and minimal (all Pearson correlations are 0)
faultline strength.
The network pictures in Figure 1 show the interac-
tion structures of the six hypothetical work teams that
follow from homophilious selection of interaction part-
ners and the respective demographic faultline strengths.
A team’s interaction structure is the social network that
results from individual selection of interaction partners.
The interaction structure shows to which degree team
members form subgroups in the sense that there is fre-
quent interaction within, and no interaction between, the
subgroups. In the network pictures, team members are
represented by nodes. To depict the effects of homophil-
ious selection of interaction partners on the interac-
tion structure, nodes have been arranged such that two
individuals are placed nearer to each other the more
demographic attributes they share (Kamada and Kawai
1989, McFarland and Bender-deMoll 2007). Accord-
ingly, if two nodes are placed nearer to each other,
the more likely they are interact. In addition, we added
a line between nodes that share at least one attribute
to indicate that interaction between these individuals is
likely. Whereas nodes without demographic similarity
may also interact, and nodes with common demographic
attributes may not always interact, demographic similar-
ity ensures that there is always a positive probability of
interaction between these nodes and that they are more
likely to interact than two nodes without demographic
overlap are.
TheA9dashed circles identify the biggest subgroups of
maximally similar individuals. In the team with the
strongest faultline (Team 1), the three demographic
attributes correlate perfectly. Each pair of actors is either
maximally similar or maximally dissimilar, and there-
fore either interacts frequently or never. On the team
level, Figure 1 depicts two perfectly homogeneous but
unconnected subgroups for Team 1. As faultline strength
decreases, however, this separation between subgroups
becomes weaker and completely disappears as faultline
strength is minimal (Team 6). For instance, there are
still two clearly distinct subgroups in Team 3 (medium
faultline strength). However, the subgroups are smaller,
and there are also team members that cannot be cate-
gorized into one of the subgroups. These actors share
demographic attributes and therefore also interact with
members of both subgroups.
In addition to homophily, Lau and Murnighan assume
that during interaction, team members exert influence
on each others’ opinions by communicating arguments
(Isenberg 1986, Myers 1982, Myers and Lamm 1976,
Vinokur and Burnstein 1978). They state,A10“Group mem-
bers who support similar attitudinal positions will find
that, as other members support that position using argu-
ments different from their own, they each have more
reason to become even more extreme than they were
before” (Lau and Murnighan 1998, p. 332). Research
on “polarization” (Myers 1982) has demonstrated how
group members tend to become more extreme dur-
ing group decision making. Faultline theory examines,
however, not just polarization within one group but it
A11also on what we denote as “subgroup polarization,” the
degree to which a work team separates into subgroups
holding opposing opinions (Lau and Murnighan 1998).
Subgroup polarization during a team’s sensemaking pro-
cess is problematic because it breeds emotional con-
flicts between the subgroups (Lau and Murnighan 1998),
which in turn hamper good team performance (Jehn
1994, Jehn and Bendersky 2003, Pelled 1996).
The interplay of homophilious selection of interac-
tion partners and influence with arguments can lead to
subgroup polarization in groups with strong faultlines.
As shown in Figure 1, homophily creates subgroups in
teams with strong faultlines. Within subgroups, team
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Figure 1 Interaction Structures of Six Hypothetical Teams with Different Faultline Strengths
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members frequently communicate arguments, but argu-
ment communication between subgroups is rare. Lau and
Murnighan argue that under these conditions, small ini-
tial opinion differences between the subgroups might
be amplified during the sensemaking process. This is
because subgroup members will mostly hear and share
arguments that support their initial opinions (Stasser
1988), causing opinions in both subgroups to shift
toward opposing ends of the opinion scale simultane-
ously. In other words, subgroup polarization increases.
By contrast, in teams with weak faultlines, group
members interact with colleagues who hold a variety of
different opinions, such that no self-reinforcing dynamic
toward emergent subgroup polarization can develop.
In short, Lau and Murnighan’s reasoning implies the
following.
Proposition 1. The stronger the faultline in a work
team is, the stronger subgroup polarization will be.
Furthermore, the processes that Lau and Murnighan
describe imply subgroup polarization only if two neces-
sary conditions are met. First, the process of subgroup
polarization crucially hinges on the assumption that ini-
tial congruency (Phillips 2003, Phillips et al. 2004) is
sufficiently strong. That is, opinions and demographic
attributes in a team need to be correlated initially, prior
to interaction between the team members. If demograph-
ically similar group members do not share opinions more
with each other than they do with demographically dis-
similar others, then the exchange of arguments within
demographic subgroups will not increase opinion differ-
ences between the groups. In this case members of one
subgroup do not learn more new arguments pro or con
toward the original opinion than the actors in the other
subgroup. As a consequence, subgroup polarization will
not occur. Thus, an initial correlation, or congruency,
between demographic attributes and opinions appears
to be an essential condition for subgroup polarization
Mäs et al.: Demographic Crisscrossing and the Effects of Faultlines on Subgroup Polarization
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even in work teams with a strong faultline. Although
Lau and Murnighan’s reasoning points to this condition,
they have not made it explicit. Nevertheless, their theory
implies the following.
Proposition 1A. Strong faultlines increase subgroup
polarization only if initial congruency between demo-
graphic attributes and the opinion is sufficiently high.
Second, subgroup polarization can only take place if
homophily is sufficiently strong. We define the strength
of homophily as the degree to which actors are more
likely to interact with similar others than with dissimilar
others (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954, Wimmer and Lewis
2010). The strength of homophily in teams depends on
team members’ individual preferences for associating
with similar colleagues, but it might also be determined
by the institutional context of work teams. For instance,
in teams with high task interdependence, workers are
forced to collaborate with both similar and dissimilar
colleagues to fulfill their tasks. Thus, in these teams sim-
ilarity will only weakly influence the choice of interac-
tion partners. As a consequence, team members interact
frequently with members who hold different opinions
and will thus be influenced by them. Such a context
would make it unlikely that the teams’ opinions polarize,
even if faultlines are strong (Molleman 2005). Again,
the ensuing proposition has been left implicit in previous
theoretical research in faultline theory.
Proposition 1B. Strong faultlines increase subgroup
polarization only if homophily is sufficiently strong.
Crisscrossing as an Alternative Explanation of
Faultline Effects
Almost a century ago, classical sociological and anthro-
pological research on social order in stateless soci-
eties (Colson 1954, Evans-Pritchard 1939, Flap 1988,
Galtung 1966, Lijphart 1977, Ross 1920, Simmel 1908)
revealed that strong faultlines may cause a problem for
social integration. For instance, Ross argued in his 1920
textbook:
A12Suppose that at a given moment there is a certain strain
along the line between Christians and Jews. If now,
a strain appears along a quite different line, e.g., that
between employers and workmen, the religious oppo-
sition will become less intense. For Jewish bosses and
Jewish workmen will be estranged; likewise Christian
bosses and Christian workmen. On the other hand, Jewish
and Christian capitalists will recognize that they are
“in the same boat,” while Jewish workers and Christian
workers will sympathize with one another as brother
victims of exploitation ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Take the case of a tension
between blacks and whites ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ If the lines of cleav-
age cross, each opposition will weaken the other. But if,
as sometimes happens, all the employers are white men
and all the employed are black men, then one antago-
nism helps the other and the rift in society is deeper then
ever ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ A society, therefore, which is riven by a dozen
oppositions along lines running in every direction, may
actually be in less danger of being torn with violence or
falling to pieces than one split along just one line. For
each new cleavage contributes to narrow the cross clefts,
so that one might say that society is sewn together by its
inner conflicts.
(Ross 1920, pp. 164–165, italics in orginal)
Although both this classical sociological and anthro-
pological literature and faultline theory agree on the
prediction that strong faultlines breed conflicts, they
base their prediction on different sets of assumptions.
Whereas faultline theory argues that the interplay of
homophily and social influence may result in sub-
group polarization, the referred sociological and anthro-
pological literature focuses on the integrating function
of “crisscrossing” actors. Crisscrossing actors are indi-
viduals that share at least one demographic attribute
with members of more than one demographic subgroup.
Because of demographic similarity, they are attached to
members of more subgroups and are thus able to con-
ciliate in case of conflicts.
From this sociological and anthropological perspec-
tive, faultline effects follow because the more demo-
graphically crisscrossing actors there are in a group, the
stronger are the integrating forces that prevent conflicts.
The number of demographically crisscrossing actors in
a group is, in turn, logically related to faultline strength.
Figure 1 shows that the higher the number of those team
members that are not part of one of the subgroups (i.e.,
crisscrossing actors), the weaker the faultline. Teams
with the maximal faultline strength (f = 1, Team 1) con-
sist of only two kinds of actors (black, B, rectangles and
white, A, circles). There are no demographically criss-
crossing actors in this team. The number of demograph-
ically crisscrossing actors increases as faultlines become
weaker. Team 2, for instance, still consists of two large
subgroups. However, there are also three crisscrossing
actors present (f = 0￿8). In short, the sociological and
anthropological approach suggests the following.
Proposition 2. The more demographically criss-
crossing actors there are in a group, the stronger are the
integrating forces that prevent subgroup polarization.
Integrating the Two Theories: Why Time Matters
The processes that the two explanations of the faultline
hypothesis propose appear to be fundamentally differ-
ent. On the one hand, Lau and Murnighan (1998) argue
that in teams with strong faultlines, demographic sub-
groups form and develop increasingly different opinions
that tear the team apart. The sociological and anthro-
pological literature, on the other hand, points to those
actors that connect the subgroups and prevent conflicts.
We argue that it is of great importance for our under-
standing of faultline effects to analyze how exactly these
two processes are related to each other. We have shown
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that only groups with maximally strong faultlines have
no demographically crisscrossing actors. If demographi-
cally crisscrossing actors can prevent group splits, does
this then imply that their presence might neutralize the
mechanism that Lau and Murnighan have described? Or
would homophilious selection and argument communi-
cation undermine the integrating effects of crisscrossing
actors if the faultline is sufficiently strong?
It turns out that the same assumptions from which
Lau and Murnighan derive their faultline hypothesis can
also be used to model the effects of crisscrossing actors.
However, as we will show, when we explicitly integrate
crisscrossing actors into Lau and Murnighan’s reason-
ing, new consequences arise for the effect of faultline
strength on the dynamics of subgroup polarization. With
our integrating model, we can identify heretofore over-
looked conditions under which the integrating effects of
crisscrossing actors can be expected to prevail upon the
dividing effect of a strong faultline.
In Particular, we find that in teams with strong fault-
lines the processes that Lau and Murnighan describe
breed polarization only in the early stage of the
sensemaking process. Later, however, demographically
crisscrossing actors will help overcome group splits.
Homophilious selection implies that demographically
crisscrossing actors interact with members of both sub-
groups because they have some demographic similarity
with members of each group. Based on persuasive argu-
ment theory (Myers 1982), we can expect that they will
get arguments from all sides and will also communi-
cate them to all subgroups they interact with. In this
way, demographically crisscrossing actors establish indi-
rect communication between the subgroups who fail to
interact directly. This may result in a gradual conver-
gence of the subgroups’ argument pools and also of their
opinions, eventually reaching opinion consensus.
This view is inspired by insights from formal theories
of social-influence dynamics in groups (Abelson 1964,
French 1956, Harary 1959). These theories suggest that
in the long run, even very few network links between
otherwise unconnected subgroups suffice to decrease
opinion differences between subgroups. Based on the
assumption of Lau and MurnighanA13(1998) that demo-
graphic overlap implies interaction, demographically
crisscrossing actors can be seen as the link that inte-
grates all group members into the network of mutual
social influences. This suggests that, in principle, one
single crisscrossing actor might suffice to create enough
indirect communication between two subgroups to bring
their opinions together. Thus, even in a group with
a strong faultline, a small number of demographically
crisscrossing actors may ensure that no subgroup is
entirely disconnected from outside influences. Accord-
ingly, there should be no long-run effect of fault-
line strength on subgroup polarization, except for the
extreme case of a maximally strong faultline that divides
the team into perfectly distinct subgroups. This absence
of an effect of faultlines across almost the entire spec-
trum of possible teams is clearly contrary to what Lau
and Murnighan (1998) suggest.
We propose that demographically crisscrossing actors
help overcome group splits in the long run. However,
we also argue that in the short run, the polarizing forces
in teams with a strong faultline can be stronger than
the integrative dynamic of indirect interaction through
demographically crisscrossing actors. When homophily
is strong, the members of the two subgroups will more
likely interact with very similar subgroup members
than with less similar crisscrossing actors. Accordingly,
it is likely that within each subgroup a local opinion
consensus develops. With high initial congruency, this
consensus will likely be on an extreme opinion, and sub-
groups initially polarize (see Proposition 1). However,
even though opinions have polarized, every member of
the subgroup still has a positive probability of interact-
ing with a demographically crisscrossing actor, at least
from time to time. Whenever this happens, there is a
chance that an argument from the out-group is adopted
by in-group members. This argument can subsequently
spread rapidly in the in-group because high demographic
similarity within the in-group leads to frequent interac-
tion between in-group members. In other words, we pro-
pose that the same mechanisms that, according to Lau
and Murnighan, imply subgroup polarization in the short
term also imply that subgroup splits are not stable in the
long run if the group comprises demographically criss-
crossing actors.
In sum, the integrated model suggests that a high ini-
tial congruency (Proposition 1A) and strong homophily
(Proposition 1B) can give rise to subgroup polariza-
tion only in the short run. In the long run, all teams
that comprise demographically crisscrossing actors will
develop opinion consensus independent of the strength
of homophily and initial congruency.
Proposition 3. In all teams where faultlines are not
maximally strong, subgroup polarization occurs only in
the short run. These teams will find consensus in the long
run and will overcome subgroup polarization (assuming
that the team composition remains fixed).
We do not claim that long-run effects are always more
important for work teams than short-run effects, espe-
cially because many work teams operate with real-time
actions and deadlines and change their composition in
the long run. We only emphasize that demographically
crisscrossing actors cause long-run effects in teams with
a fixed composition that are radically different from
short-run effects.
The Model
The logical implications of the combination of homo-
philious selection, social influence, and faultline strength
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result from a complex interplay of these mechanisms
simultaneously operating in multiple actors responding
to each others’ behavior. The method of computational
agent-based modeling (Adner et al. 2009, Harrison et al.
2007, Macy and Willer 2002) provides multiple exam-
ples of how in such a complex multiagent system sim-
ple theoretical assumptions may generate counterintu-
itive implications that would have been overlooked with-
out model formalization (e.g., Frank and Fahrbach 1999,
Siggelkow and Rivkin 2006, Stasser 1988). Accord-
ingly, we conducted a test of the logical consistency
of our reasoning (Adner et al. 2009) with a computa-
tional model. Obviously, for the computational model,
we needed to implement some simplifying assumptions.
Whenever we felt some doubt that these assumptions are
fully in line with the implicit assumptions of faultline
theory, we conducted simulations also with alternative
ways of operationalization. The central results of these
additional analyses will be mentioned below and are dis-
cussed in more detail in the online appendix (available
at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1120.0767).
The formal model is based on the two mechanisms the
reasoning of Lau and Murnighan’s (1998): homophilious
selection of interaction partners and social influence with
arguments. Our analyses of model implications focus
on the dynamics of team members’ opinions and the
degree to which opinion differences aggregate to sub-
group polarization, the degree to which subgroups hold
opposing opinions. However, the model also takes into
account the arguments that form the basis of team mem-
bers’ opinions. In this model, each of the N team mem-
bers is represented as an agent i characterized by D
demographic attributes (ci￿d) and K opinions (oi￿k),
where d refers to the d￿th demographic dimension and
k to the k￿th opinion. The demographic attributes can
take the value of either 1 or −1 (ci￿d ∈ ￿−1￿1￿) and
represent characteristics that are not open to social influ-
ence (e.g., gender, age) or that change at a much slower
rate than opinions (e.g., skills, personal values). There-
fore, we assume that the demographic attributes do not
Figure 2 Example of the Updating Process with K = 1
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change in the progress of interaction. The opinions of
the actors vary between −1 and +1 (−1 ≤ oi￿k ≤ +1)
and are open to influence.
Following Lau and Murnighan’s theory (1998, p. 332),
we included that agents base their opinions on argu-
ments ak￿ l. For simplicity, we represent arguments as
being either in favor of or against holding a pro opinion
(oi￿k > 0) on the corresponding issue (ak￿ l ∈ ￿−1￿1￿).
For each issue k, there exist P pro arguments (ak￿ l = 1)
and C con arguments (ak￿ l = −1). Which arguments
exist in a given work team setting is summarized in the
arguments matrix. This matrix has K columns and P+C
rows. Cells with a row number smaller than P + 1 hold
pro arguments; i.e., ak￿ l =+1. The remaining rows hold
con arguments; i.e., ak￿ l =−1A14(cf. Figure 2, matrix a).
Empirical research suggests that people have limited
capacities to remember and process information (Cowan
2001, Miller 1956). Accordingly, we assume that agents
base their opinion on S relevant arguments (S ≤ P +C).
Technically, an agent’s opinion on issue k is the aver-
age value of the arguments (ak￿ l) the agent considers as
relevant (see Equation (1)). Thus, the more pro (con)
arguments an agent’s sample of arguments comprises,
the higher (lower) the value of the agent’s opinion will
be. For simplicity, all S relevant arguments are equally
weighted in the calculation of the opinion. This means
that the relevant arguments do not differ in their persua-
siveness. A technical implication of this assumption is
that an agent’s opinion can adopt only S + 1 different
values:
A15
oi￿k = 1S
S￿
l=1
ak￿ l￿ (1)
Following research on memory processes (Brown and
Chater 2001), we assume that agents disregard argu-
ments if they are not sufficiently recent. Thus, the more
recent an argument is at a given point in time, the longer
this argument will remain relevant for the formation
of the agent’s opinion. This is implemented for each
agent in a relevance matrix. The relevance matrix has
K columns and has P +C rows. Each element indicates
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how recent the respective argument is for the agent. Ele-
ments of the relevance matrix with a row number smaller
than P + 1 identify how recent pro arguments are, and
the remaining elements determine how recent con argu-
ments are. We denote how recent an argument is (sl￿ i)
with integer values between 0 and S (sl￿ i ∈ ￿0￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿S￿).
A value of sl￿ i = 0 indicates that the argument al is not
sufficiently recent and therefore not relevant for actor i.
Values above 0 indicate that this argument is sufficiently
recent and therefore affects actor i’s opinion. The most
recent argument has the value of sl￿ i = S, the second-
most recent argument has the value S − 1, and so on.
Thus, if an agent considers three arguments (S = 3), then
one has a recency of 1, one has a recency of 2, and one
has a recency of 3. The recency rank of an argument
does not affect the argument’s persuasiveness—that is,
the extent to which an argument shapes the current opin-
ion (see Equation (1)). However, the recency determines
how long an argument affects the agent’s opinion in the
influence process. The exact rules for updating argument
recency will be elaborated further below (see the Argu-
ment Communication section).
Lau and Murnighan (1998) assume that a team’s
sensemaking process consists of a series of discussion
meetings of the team’s demographic subgroups (p. 332).
This is a plausible scenario for small work teams,
because subgroups consist of very few team members.
For instance, a four-person team with maximal gender
diversity consists of a male and a female dyad. However,
in bigger teams (see, e.g., the teams in Figure 1), demo-
graphic subgroups consist of multiple members, and
meetings therefore require some sort of organization, an
important aspect that Lau and Murnighan do not address.
In contrast, empirical research showed that work-related
issues are often discussed in informal dyadic interactions
that provide a relevant channel of persuasion (Oh et al.
2004, Weenig 1999). We therefore model the sense-
making process of a team as a sequence of informal
dyadic interactions between team members in which
thoughts about a work-related issue are communicated
from one team member to the other. In small groups,
this resembles Lau and Murnighan’s assumption of sub-
group meetings because demographic subgroups consist
of very few team members. In bigger teams, modeling
dyadic interaction does not exclude interactions like in
a meeting, in which a team member communicates the
same argument to a number of other members, but it
breaks these interactions down in their most elementary
unit, the transfer of an argument from one individual
to another. In a similar vein, assuming dyadic interac-
tion does not exclude mutual influence. In fact, it is
very likely that two agents influence each other mutually
because homophily implies that the selection of interac-
tion partners is based on similarity, which by definition
is a symmetric concept.
In sum, we model the sensemaking process of a team
as a sequence of interaction events. Each interaction
starts with the partner selection phase and is continued
by the social influence phase. In the partner selection
phase, two agents are matched for interaction, based on
homophilious selection. Subsequently, an opinion of one
of the interacting agents is updated, based on the argu-
ment communication mechanism.
Homophilious Selection
We implement the partner selection phase as follows.
In each event, an agent i is randomly selected. All agents
have at all events the same probability to be selected.
Then an interaction partner j (j ￿= i∗) is chosen. To incor-
porate homophily, the probability that actor j is cho-
sen as interaction partner (pj ) depends on the similarity
between i∗ and j . In line with Lau and Murnighan’s
theory (see Figure 1) and empirical findings (Ibarra
1992, McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987, McPherson
et al. 2001, Ruef et al. 2003), we assume that simi-
larity is based on the D demographic characteristics.
In addition, empirical research following the similarity-
attraction paradigm also suggests that opinion similar-
ity increases the probability to interact (Byrne 1971).
Therefore, Equation (2) includes that the similarity
simi∗￿ j between i∗ and j depends on both demographic
attributes and the opinions. We explored to which degree
model implications depend on the consideration of opin-
ion similarity in the selection process (see §6 of the
online appendix). It turned out that all findings on the
effects of demographic faultlines that we report in this
paper can also be replicated with a model version in
which similarity is solely based on demographic char-
acteristics and opinions are not taken into account. This
suggests that considering opinion similarity in the selec-
tion process does not affect model implications in a crit-
ical way for the scenarios that we inspected.
Similarity simi∗￿ j varies between 0 and 1. A similarity
of 0 means that the two actors are maximally dissim-
ilar, whereas a value of 1 indicates that both hold the
same opinions and the same demographic attributes. We
assume that all attributes are equally weighted in the
calculation of similarity. Formally stated,
simi∗￿ j = 12 · ￿D+K￿
￿ D￿
d=1
￿2− ￿ci￿d − cj￿d￿￿
+
K￿
k=1
￿2− ￿oi￿k− oj￿k￿￿
￿
￿ (2)
The probability that actor j is selected as an interaction
partner of i (pj ) is derived from the relative similar-
ity of i∗ and j compared to the similarities of i∗ to all
other agents, except i∗ herself. To vary the strength of
homophily, we include, furthermore, a parameter h into
the model (h > 0). The higher the value of h, the more
the relative similarity of the focal agent i∗ and agent j
increases the probability that j will be chosen as an
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interactionA16partner:
pj =
￿simi∗￿ j￿
h￿N−1
j=1￿ j ￿=i￿simi∗￿ j￿h
￿ (3)
In the computer program, the actual selection of i∗’s
interaction partner was implemented in three steps. First,
the interaction probability pj is calculated for each of
the N − 1 potential interaction partners (j ￿= i∗) (Equa-
tion (3)). The interaction probabilities pj sum up to 1.
We partition the unit interval into subintervals such that
to each potential a subinterval of length pj is assigned.
Second, a random number between 0 and 1 is drawn
from a uniform distribution. Third, the agent j whose
interval contains this randomly drawn number is selected
for interaction. Note that the ordering of the agents in
this sequence does not affect the outcome of the selec-
tion process. In this way, all agents with a nonzero
interaction probability can be selected with a probabil-
ity pj . Thus, the more similar j is to i∗, the higher is
the probability that they will interact. If two actors dif-
fer maximally with regard to their opinions and their
demographic attributes, then the probability of interac-
tion equals 0.
Argument Communication
After the interaction partners i∗ and j∗ have been
selected for the respective event, agent i∗ is influenced
by j∗. We implement social influence through arguments
in two steps. First, one of the arguments that j∗ con-
siders for the formation of her own opinion is adopted
by i∗. For this, one of the K opinions is selected ran-
domly for update (k∗), with the same probability (1/K)
for all opinions. Then, one of the S arguments that j∗
considers relevant is picked (ak∗￿ l∗) with equal probabil-
ity (1/S) for all recent arguments. Arguments that are
not relevant for j∗ are not chosen. The chosen argument
is adopted by i∗. Technically, the argument ak∗￿ l∗ in i∗’s
relevance matrix adopts the value S+1 (sk∗￿ l∗￿ i∗ = S+1).
When an agent’s relevance matrix has been updated
repeatedly, it can happen that all existing arguments have
been adopted at least once. However, it does not seem
reasonable that after some time agents consider all argu-
ments as relevant. In contrast, empirical research con-
firms that humans have very limited cognitive capacities
and tend to disregard dated information (for a review, see
Brown and Chater 2001; see also Sederberg et al. 2008).
To take this into account, we implemented a second step
of the influence process. The second step ensures that
the number of arguments that are relevant for an agent
remains constant at S during the whole sensemaking pro-
cess. This implies that when an agent i∗ has adopted
an argument that has not been considered before, one
of the arguments that is currently relevant for i∗ will
be dropped. We assume that agents drop the argument
that has been adopted least recently. This reflects the
idea that every time an agent hears an argument from
an interaction partner, the cognitive importance of that
argument is reinforced. The longer ago an argument has
been heard from another agent without hearing it again,
the less important the argument is considered to be, and
sooner or later it will be seen as entirely unimportant
(Brown and Chater 2001, Sederberg et al. 2008). Tech-
nically, we implement this in the model such that the
relevance matrix of i∗ is updated by subtracting one from
all nonzero recency values with a higher recency than
the transmitted argument prior to interaction. The argu-
ment that was communicated between i∗ and j∗ in the
present event adopts a recency value of S (sk∗￿ l∗￿ i∗ = S)
at the end of the iteration. All other relevant arguments
decline in recency.
To illustrate the updating phase, Figure 2 contains
two examples. Matrix (a) in Figure 2 is an example
of an argument matrix with one column (K = 1) and
four pro and four con arguments per issue (P =C = 4).
Matrix (b) is the initial relevance matrix of agent i∗.
Agent i∗ bases her opinion on one pro and three con
arguments (S = 4). According to Equation (1), this
results in an opinion value of oi￿k =−1/2. Matrix (c) is
the relevance matrix of i∗’s interaction partner j∗. Before
the update, the first argument is not considered relevant
by i∗ (see the circle in matrix (b)), but it is considered
relevant by j∗. Hence, it is possible that i∗ adopts the
first argument, resulting in the updated relevance matrix
for i∗ shown in (d). Here, the communicated argument
is maximally recent (see the circle in matrix (d)). The
recency of the remaining arguments has been reduced
by 1. Note that this changed i∗’s opinion, which shifted
from −1/2 to 0 because i∗ adopted a pro and dropped
a con argument. As a second example, assume now that
not the first argument is selected for update, but argu-
ment number 5 instead. This argument has already been
considered by i∗ (see the square in matrix (b)). However,
its recency has increased as a result of the interaction
with j∗ (see the square in matrix (e)). Note that this has
no consequence on i∗’s opinion.
Lau and Murnighan (1998) did not specify which
cognitive processes underlie social influence with argu-
ments. Therefore, we tested alternative dropping rules to
ensure that our findings do not critically depend on the
assumptions we have added to the model. Most impor-
tantly, we implemented that the argument for dropping
is selected at random instead of selecting the least recent
argument. Computational experiments revealed that all
qualitative results reported below are robust to this mod-
ification of the model (see §5 of the online appendix).
This suggests that the results are not driven by the type
of dropping rule we applied.
In addition, we experimented with the assumption that
agents tend to drop those arguments that do not favor
their current opinion (Heider 1967). We show in §5 of
the online appendix that this is an additional mechanism
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that can generate subgroup polarization. However, the
aim of this study is to test the exact implications of
Lau and Murnighan’s theory. Therefore, it is critical
to avoid adding new mechanisms that interfere with
Lau and Murnighan’s theory. Hence, we excluded this
assumption.
Interaction events are iterated until dynamics have
reached equilibrium. In other words, after the opinion
of agent i∗ has been updated based on the interaction
with j∗, the computer again picks an agent and selects
an interaction partner that transmits an argument. This
is repeated until no further changes in the distribution
of arguments or opinions can occur in the dynamic sys-
tem that the team constitutes. We deemed it necessary
to run the simulation up to this point, because other-
wise, misleading conclusions may be drawn about the
determinants of consensus or polarization, as the short-
or intermediate-run behavior of stochastic systems may
be radically different from their long-run equilibrium
behavior (Young 2001).
In our analyses, we study under which conditions the
simulated work teams develop stable opinion consensus
or split up into subgroups with opposing opinions. Nev-
ertheless, to identify whether dynamics have reached a
state of absolute stability, it is important to not only
focus on the distribution of opinions but also take into
account the distribution of arguments. For instance, if
all team members hold the same opinion but base that
opinion on different sets of arguments, then communica-
tion of arguments can still lead to opinion changes, and
opinion consensus can break up again. This implication
of argument-based influence wasA17originally addressed
by Lau and Murnighan (1998) in their informal the-
ory, which holds that the sensemaking process of work
teams may not be completed when the team has reached
opinion consensus, because “one or more group mem-
bers question the group’s evolving, dominant script”
(p. 332). This so-called “challenging process” is of par-
ticular importance during the sensemaking process of
work teams, because “early group actions or decisions
critically influence subsequent group processes” (Lau
and Murnighan 1998, p. 332). We demonstrate below
that the challenging process also plays a significant role
in the simulated sensemaking process generated by the
formal model of Lau and Murnighan’s theory.
Our model has exactly two equilibria corresponding to
perfect consensus or perfect subgroup polarization. Per-
fect consensus is reached when all agents hold the same
opinions and base these opinions on the same arguments.
In a work team that has reached this state, any further
exchange of arguments will not lead to opinion changes
because it will provide team members only with argu-
ments that they already consider relevant. Perfect sub-
group polarization is obtained if there are two subgroups,
the members of each subgroup agree on all opinions and
arguments with each other, and the pairwise similarity
(simi￿ j ) between agents of different subgroups is 0. That
is, the members of the subgroups maximally differ with
respect to all demographic attributes and all opinions.
If all members of the subgroups base their opinions on
the same arguments, then this outcome is stable. Any
constellation that is not characterized by perfect consen-
sus or perfect subgroup polarization is transient in the
sense that it is logically possible that subsequent inter-
action leads to opinion changes of at least one team
member. Therefore, the computer simulation process is
continued until either perfect consensus or perfect sub-
group polarization is reached.
Obviously, perfect subgroup polarization can only be
stable in teams where faultline strength is maximal
(f = 1), because in these teams there are no crisscross-
ing agents. Demographically crisscrossing agents share
at least one demographic attribute with members of both
demographic subgroups. Accordingly, if there is a demo-
graphically crisscrossing agent and the two subgroups
still disagree, a positive probability remains that argu-
ments of the one subgroup are adopted by the other and
the disagreement will vanish.
Some of our analyses focus on the duration of the
sensemaking process, i.e., the time that it takes before
perfect consensus or perfect polarization has been
reached. To be sure, we refrain from formulating state-
ments about effects of the independent variables in our
experiments on the absolute duration (e.g., in days or
seconds) of the sensemaking process. We are not aware
of any empirical evidence that would allow meaning-
fully assessing the duration of a simulated interaction
event in real time. In addition, the duration of interac-
tion events, and also their frequency per day or week,
certainly depends to a considerable extent on the orga-
nizational and cultural setting, suggesting that auxil-
iary assumptions need to be included in order to arrive
at testable conclusions about the exact duration of the
sensemaking process in a given setting. Similar to Lau
and Murnighan’s theory, our model is not restricted to
specific work team settings. Nevertheless, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that the more interaction events occur
before equilibrium, the longer such a process also would
take in real time. This allows us to compare the relative
length of the process in terms of number of simulation
events under different conditions.
Simulation Experiments
The central outcome variable of faultline theory is the
level of subgroup polarization in work teams. To quan-
tify subgroup polarization, we use a measure called
polarization (Flache and Mäs 2008a). It captures the
degree to which the group can be separated into a small
set of factions that are mutually antagonistic in the opin-
ion space and have maximal internal agreement. To
compute polarization, we use the variance of pairwise
Mäs et al.: Demographic Crisscrossing and the Effects of Faultlines on Subgroup Polarization
Organization Science, Articles in Advance, pp. 1–21, © 2012 INFORMS 11
opinion agreement across all pairs of agents in the pop-
ulation, where agreement ranges between −1 (total dis-
agreement) and +1 (full agreement), measured as 1
minus the distance of opinions. This measure obviously
adopts its lowest level of 0 for the case of perfect opinion
consensus. The maximum level of subgroup polarization
(polarization = 1) is obtained when the population is
equally divided between the opposite ends of the opin-
ion scale at −1 and +1, and all opinion dimensions are
perfectly correlated.
To test whether the propositions follow consistently
from the model, we conducted computational exper-
iments, varying three model parameters: the strength
of faultlines (f ), the initial correlation between demo-
graphic attributes and opinions (w), and the strength of
homophily (h).
Across all conditions of the simulation experiment,
we assumed that the team members hold three salient
demographic attributes (D = 3) and that diversity is
maximal on all three dimensions (= 50:50 distribution).
To allow under these specifications a sufficiently fine-
grained variation of the central independent variable,
faultline strength, we assumed a big but not unrealistic
(Wegge et al. 2008) team size of 20 (N = 20). Further-
more, we assumed that the team focuses on one main
issue (K = 1). All results could be replicated if two
issues (K = 2) are taken into account, all other things
being equal (see §4 of the online appendix).
Based on results from research on human’s capac-
ity to store information (Cowan 2001), we assigned the
value 4 to S in all conditions. This assumes that the
agents base their opinions on four arguments. We show
in the online appendix that we could replicate our results
also for a higher value of S. In general, we find that
the stronger subgroup polarization is, the smaller S is.
Finally, we assumed that there exist 10 pro (P = 10) and
10 con (C = 10) arguments. We selected values for P
and C that are higher than S to create sufficient varia-
tion in the argumentA18sets between pairs of agents with
identical opinions. This decreases the chance that agents
with similar opinions provide each other with arguments
that they already consider relevant. Otherwise, interac-
tion between agents with similar opinions does not lead
to opinion changes, and the reinforcing effects of argu-
ment exchange that Lau and Murnighan describe can-
not develop. P = C = 10 is high enough to avoid this
and also reflects that the issue is not too complex to be
unrealistic.
To vary faultline strength (f ) in the experiments, we
used exactly the same distributions of demographic
attributes that we used in Figure 1A19(cf. Flache and Mäs
2008a, b). We varied the Pearson correlation between
each pair of demographic attributes from 0 to 1 in steps
of 0.2. Of course, there are many alternative distribu-
tions of the three variables that result in the same bivari-
ate correlations. The distributions we used, however, are
the only ones that produce equal correlations between
all pairs of demographic attributes and at the same time
keep diversity maximal. We chose equal correlations to
resolve a conceptual unclarity in Lau and Murnighan’s
definition of faultline strength. Do we, for example,
speak of a strong faultline if two variables x and y
are perfectly correlated but completely unrelated to a
third variable z? Or, would we regard the faultline as
stronger or weaker if x and y are correlated only with
r = 0￿8 but the correlation between x and z would rise
to 0.6? These questions do not occur if all pairs or vari-
ables are equally correlated. Furthermore, considering
unequal correlations between the demographic attributes
does not affect the results. Also, with unequal correla-
tions, it holds that the weaker the correlation between
the demographic dimensions, the smaller the subgroups
and the more crisscrossing actors there are in a team.
Furthermore, as long as not all pairwise correlations are
maximal (f = 1), crisscrossing actors are present.
To manipulate the level of initial congruency (w),
we related the initial opinion to the first demographic
attribute. The extent to which this affects the correlation
of the opinion with the remaining demographic attributes
depends on faultline strength (f ). The stronger the fault-
line, the higher the correlation between the first demo-
graphic attribute and the other demographic attributes.
Accordingly, the stronger the faultline, the more simi-
lar the correlations between the opinion and the first,
second, etc., demographic attribute. Technically, we
assigned S arguments to each agent. For each of the S
arguments, we assigned one of the existing pro argu-
ments with the probability w when the agent holds the
value 1 at the first demographic attribute and one of
the con arguments otherwise. Agents with the value
−1 on the first demographic attribute received a pro
argument with probability 1 − w. For instance, if w
is 0.5, then pro and con arguments always have the
same probability to be assigned. On average, this results
in a Pearson correlation between the first demographic
attribute and the opinion of 0. However, as w increases,
agents with the value 1 (−1) at the first demographic
attribute more likely receive a pro (con) argument. This
entails a higher Pearson correlation between the first
demographic attribute and the opinion as w increases.
Under w = 1, the opinion and the first demographic
attribute perfectly align. More precisely, all agents that
hold the value 1 at the first demographic attribute also
hold opinion values of 1, and all agents who belong to
the other demographic subgroup on the first dimension
hold opinion values of −1.
We varied w between 0.5 and 1 in steps of 0.1. We
do not consider w-values below 0.5. Such values would
lead to a negative correlation between the opinion and
the demographic attributes. Because the actual values
of the opinion and the demographic attributes have no
substantial meaning, it makes no difference if opinions
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and demographic are positively or negatively correlated.
To test the effects of the strength of homophily, we
manipulated the parameter h (see Equation (3)), varying
it between 1 and 5 with steps of 1. A value of h = 1
expresses that agents have a weak preference to interact
with similar team mates. The value of h= 5 corresponds
to a very strong homophily.
All in all, we inspect 6∗6∗5= 180 conditions in our
computational experiments. The five conditions in which
faultline strength is maximal (f = 1) and the initial cor-
relation between opinions and demographic attributes is
maximal (w = 1) have been excluded because the sim-
ilarity (simi￿ j ) between agents is either 1 or 0 under
this condition. In these cases, it is logically impossible
that members of different subgroups will interact, and
Figure 3 Ideal-Typical Run with Maximal Faultline Strength (f = 1, h= 5, w = 0￿8)
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opinions cannot change. For reliability, we conducted
500 independent replications per experimental condition.
Results
We present the results in three steps. In the first step, we
present two ideal-typical simulation runs to illustrate the
model dynamics. We then turn to the consistency tests
of the five propositions. Finally, we present additional
analyses that revealed an unexpected effect of faultline
strength.
Ideal-Typical Simulation Runs
Figure 3 demonstrates an ideal-typical simulation run
with maximal faultline strength (f = 1). To trigger
subgroup polarization, we imposed conditions that,
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according to the Propositions 1A and B, make polariza-
tion very likely. We assumed strong homophily (h= 5)
and imposed a relatively strong correlation of initial
opinions with demographic attributes (w = 0￿8). The
latter generated for thisA20run an initial Pearson corre-
lation between the opinion and the three demographic
attributes of 0.77. Figure 3 shows the development of
polarization and the distribution of the opinion at differ-
ent stages of the simulation run. The histograms show
the respective opinion distribution. The network pictures
describe the resulting interaction structure. In the net-
work pictures, each agent is represented by a circle.
TheA21color of a circle indicates to which of the two
demographic subgroups the respective agent belongs.
Each pair of agents that has a nonzero overall similarity
(simi￿ j ) is connected by a line, symbolizing the nonzero
probability that these two agents interact. Because we
focus here on the development of opinions in the team,
the arrangement of the circles is only based on opin-
ion similarity. Thus, circles are arranged in a way such
that the nearer agents are placed to each other, the more
similar their opinions are (Kamada and Kawai 1989,
McFarland and Bender-deMoll 2007).
Initially (1st event in Figure 3), the opinion was
almost uniformly distributed in this simulation run. Nev-
ertheless, the corresponding network picture reveals that
there are already initially systematic opinion differences
between the demographic subgroups. The change of the
histograms of the subsequent events shows that, over
time, opinion differences between the subgroups in-
crease. Consequently, the number of lines between the
subgroups also decreases. Eventually (by the 3,400th
event) the subgroups hold maximally opposing opinions.
The exchange of arguments between subgroups stopped
at this point because there is no overlap in demo-
graphic attributes or in opinions between agents from
different subgroups. Opinion changes have now become
impossible because agents only interact with team
members who hold the same opinion and arguments.
The online appendix contains further statistics of this
ideal-typical run and an animation film (see the
file “max_faultline.mov”) that illustrates the network
dynamics.
Figure 3 depicts ideal-typical dynamics that ended in
a stable group split. This shows that our model can gen-
erate the dynamics that Lau and Murnighan (1998) pro-
pose if the faultline is maximally strong. Proposition 3,
however, expects that dynamics differ crucially when
crisscrossing actors are present. Figure 4 shows an ideal-
typical run that supports the proposition. In this run,
faultlines were slightly weaker than in the condition of
Figure 3. For comparison, we retain all further param-
eters of the first illustrative run with maximal faultline
strength (h= 5, w = 0￿8), but we slightly reduce the
strength of the faultline to f = 0￿8, which implies that
the team contains three crisscrossing agents (see the
three squares in network pictures of Figure 4). Initially
(see the 1st event), the opinion is again almost uniformly
distributed and the demographic subgroups already hold
somewhat different opinions. Again, we observe increas-
ing subgroup polarization, just as Lau and Murnighan
proposed. After the 705th, event the work teams fell
apart into two opposing subgroups with maximally dif-
ferent opinions. Within the two subgroups, the agents
share the same opinions and also quickly coordinate on
a common vector of arguments. However, the two sub-
groups are not completely unconnected: because of the
three crisscrossing actors, there is still some exchange
of arguments between the subgroups. The network pic-
ture of the 11,750th event demonstrates that one of the
crisscrossing actors adopted an argument that changed
his opinion. Subsequently, this argument spreads in the
crisscrossing actors’ subgroup, and the opinion differ-
ences between the subgroups decrease (see the 13,160th
event). This convergence process continues until overall
consensus is reached. In the online appendix, we provide
an animation film (see the file “strong_faultline.mov”)
of this ideal-typical simulation run.
Consistency Tests of the Propositions
Long-Term Effects. According to Lau and Murnighan
(1998), higher faultline strength entails more subgroup
polarization (Proposition 1). Proposition 3, however,
claims that in teams with nonmaximal faultline strength,
this effect can only be observed in the short term. Our
experiments clearly confirmed Proposition 3. All simu-
lated work teams with faultline strength below its theo-
retical maximum eventually ended in overall consensus.
That is, all team members held the same opinion and
based it on exactly the same arguments.
In teams with maximally strong faultlines, however,
we found perfect subgroup polarization, but not in all
simulation runs. Figure 5 shows how the initial con-
gruency (w) and the strength of homophily (h) affected
the frequency of runs that ended in perfect subgroup
polarization. More precisely, the size of the bubbles in
Figure 5 corresponds to the percentage of runs under the
respective condition that ended in stable group splits. For
instance, 49.6% of 500 runs with very strong homophily
(h = 5) and very strong initial correlation between the
opinion and the demographic attributes (w= 0￿9) ended
in a group split with two equally large subgroups and
maximally opposing opinions. As suggested by Propo-
sitions 1A and 1B, the higher the values of h and w
are, the more likely subgroup polarization occurs. Fig-
ure 5 thus confirms that our implementation of Lau
and Murnighan’s mechanisms can explain stable sub-
group polarization in teams with maximally strong fault-
lines. However, even with maximal faultline strength,
group splits remain unlikely if homophily is weak or the
opinions are not already initially strongly aligned with
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Figure 4 Ideal-Typical Run with Three Crisscrossing Agents (f = 0￿8, h= 5, w = 0￿8)
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the demographic attributes. If homophily is weak, then
agents exchange arguments across subgroup boundaries
and thereby decrease subgroup polarization. If congru-
ency is weak, then members of different demographic
subgroups hold similar opinions that lead to communi-
cation between the groups and further convergence of
opinions as well.
Short-Term Effects. Proposition 3 predicts increasing
subgroup polarization in the short term even though
teams reach consensus in the long term. To assess the
short-term polarization in the simulated work teams,
we measured the maximal value of polarization that
teams exhibited during simulation runs and compared
this value to the runs’ initial value of polarization. The
difference between these two values indicates to which
degree groups split up in the short run independent of
whether the split occurred right at the beginning of the
run or later. To test whether faultlines trigger short-term
polarization (Proposition 3), Figure 6 shows bar graphs
broken down by faultline strength (f ). The gray part of
each bar in Figure 6 depicts the average initial level of
polarization in the teams. The black part of the bars
shows the average increase in polarization. Both parts
add up to the average of the maximal value of polariza-
tion. We excluded the conditions where w = 1, because
here polarization is initialized at its logical maximum
and cannot further increase. Figure 6 shows a stronger
increase in the maximal value of polarization as fault-
lines become stronger (f ) and thus supports Proposi-
tion 3. At least in the short run, strong faultlines increase
subgroup polarization.
According to Proposition 1A, the higher the initial
congruency, the stronger the short-term effect of strong
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Figure 5 Percentage of Runs with Maximal Faultline Strength
￿f = 1￿ That Ended in Stable Splits
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faultlines on polarization should be. To test that, we dis-
play in Figure 7 the effects of congruency (w) on max-
imal polarization broken down by faultline strength f .
The figure shows that the initial polarization depends
on w (see the gray parts of the bars). This is a tech-
nical consequence of congruency that occurs because
opinions align closer with the 50:50 split on the val-
ues of +1 and −1 in the first demographic attribute, as
w increases. There is, however, no such relationship of
initial opinion polarization to faultline strength because
the distribution of the first demographic attribute is the
same for all levels of faultline strength. It turns out
that the maximal value of polarization (see the complete
bars) in all subgraphs increases with w. However, as the
size of the black areas shows, this is mainly the result
of our manipulation of w. If faultlines are not strong
(f < 0￿8), the mean increase of polarization declines
with the initial correlation between opinion and the first
Figure 6 Average Maximal Opinion Polarization Over
Faultline Strength f (15,000 Runs per Bar)
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demographic attribute. We believe that this results from
a ceiling effect. If faultlines are weak, then most pairs of
agents have a relatively high similarity (simij ) because
of shared demographic attributes. The potential of opin-
ion polarization in these teams is thus very low. If w is
high, these teams start out close to their potential max-
imum of polarization. As a consequence, polarization
can only rise moderately above the initial level and will
decline soon thereafter. If faultlines are strong (f > 0￿6),
however, the model produces the effect of w that Propo-
sition 1A expected. The black parts of the bars in the
subgraphs for faultline strengths of 0.8 and 1 show that
a higher initial correlation of opinion and first demo-
graphic attribute entails more opinion polarization.
Proposition 1B suggests that subgroup polarization
should increase with stronger homophily. Figure 8 con-
firms that the increase in polarization (see the black
parts of the bars) is higher for stronger homophily (h).
The comparison of different faultline levels also reveals
that the effect of homophily strength increases in the
strength of faultlines (f ). If faultlines are weak, then
even a very strong preference of the agents to interact
with similar team members causes only a little increase
in polarization in the short run. If faultlines are stronger,
then strong homophily results in a larger increase in
polarization.
Relative Time Until Convergence
The simulation experiments have confirmed that all
teams that contained crisscrossing actors eventually
arrived at overall consensus, even though many polarized
in the short term. Teams where subgroup polarization
increased in the short term but consensus was reached in
the long run typically experienced subgroup polarization
only at the beginning of the sensemaking process. As an
illustration, in teams with maximal faultline strength
(f = 1) and very strong homophily (h= 5) that eventu-
ally reached consensus, the highest degree of polariza-
tion that the respective team experienced was overcome,
on average, after 9.5% of the overall duration of the
respective simulation run.
The analyses of the length of the subsequent conver-
gence process, however, led to an unexpected and coun-
terintuitive result: the stronger the faultline in a team
and the stronger homophily, the faster the teams arrive
at overall consensus. Figure 9 shows a bubble graph
expressing the average number of events it took until the
runs ended in overall consensus, broken down by fault-
line strength (f ) and homophily strength (h). The graph
shows that the stronger the faultline was, the faster over-
all consensus was reached. It also shows that stronger
homophily is associated with faster emergence of overall
consensus.
To confirm the counterintuitive result about relative
time needed until convergence, we conducted simu-
lation experiments where teams started with perfect
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Figure 7 Average Maximal Opinion Polarization Over Initial Congruency w , by Faultline Strength f (2,500 Runs per Bar)
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polarization (w = 1) and varied faultline strength (see
the online appendix). In the runs with weak faultlines
(f = 0), the teams very quickly overcame the group split,
but it took them very long to arrive at overall consensus.
By contrast, it took the teams with a strong faultline
Figure 8 Average Maximal Opinion Polarization Over Homophily Strength h, by Faultline Strength f (2,500 Runs per Bar)
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(f = 0￿8) longer to overcome the initial group split.
However, once the split was overcome, these teams
quickly found a perfect consensus. Thus, teams with
strong faultlines appear to find an overall consensus
faster once a group split is overcome. This phase of the
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Figure 9 Average Number of Events Until the Teams Arrived
at Equilibrium Based on the Same Arguments
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team process resembles what Lau and Murnighan (1998)
refer to as the challenging process; in this phase, opin-
ions have converged but “one or more group members
question the group’s evolving, dominant script” (p. 332).
Why do teams with strong homophily and a strong
faultline overcome the challenging phase faster? We
explain this effect as a consequence of the interaction
structure in teams with strong faultlines (see Figure 1).
The same interaction structure that causes subgroup
polarization in the short term accelerates the conver-
gence process as soon as the opinion split has been
overcome.
As we have shown in Figure 1, teams with strong
faultlines consist of demographically homogeneous sub-
groups. If homophily is strong, agents mostly interact
and exchange arguments with the members of their own
subgroup. Within each subgroup, arguments that happen
to be relevant for many subgroup members are commu-
nicated relatively frequently and are thus likely spread
throughout the complete subgroup such that all subgroup
members consider them relevant. The fewer subgroup
members that consider a given argument relevant, the
less likely this argument is to be communicated dur-
ing interaction. As a consequence, arguments that are
rather uncommon will not spread among subgroup mem-
bers. Furthermore, those few agents that do consider
an uncommon argument relevant are frequently exposed
to alternative arguments. Therefore, their recency value
of the uncommon arguments will decrease and likely
drop to 0. In this way, the overall number of arguments
considered relevant by the members of each subgroup
decreases over time, and eventually, members of each
subgroup coordinate on a common set of arguments and
find a local opinion consensus.
However, when there are crisscrossing agents, new
arguments can enter a subgroup. It is possible that all
subgroup members adopt a new argument and collec-
tively drop one of the arguments used before. As a con-
sequence, the subgroup members will coordinate on a
new set of arguments and will find a new subgroup
consensus on an opinion that is more similar to the
other subgroup’s opinion than before the entry of the
new argument. In addition, an argument that has been
dropped by all subgroup members and that is not rel-
evant for the members of the other subgroup will not
reoccur in later interactions.
In teams with few crisscrossing agents (strong fault-
lines), new arguments enter the subgroups relatively sel-
domly. As a consequence, subgroups have enough time
to coordinate on a common set of arguments before
the next new argument enters. This leads to a gradual
convergence of the opinions across subgroups. Instead,
in teams with a weak faultline, there are more criss-
crossing agents, and new arguments enter the discussion
within subgroups more frequently. This can be so fre-
quent that the members of the subgroups do not find con-
sensus before a new argument enters. As a consequence,
the number of arguments as well as opinion diversity
within each subgroup remains high, and the gradual con-
vergence of subgroups that we found in groups with
strong faultlines does not develop. Furthermore, frequent
argument exchange with crisscrossing actors leads to a
fast spread of arguments across the entire team. Thus,
if the members of a subgroup collectively drop an argu-
ment, this argument may still be used by other team
members and might reenter the discussion in the sub-
group over and over again. Overall, the convergence of
opinions occurs faster in the interaction network of a
team with a strong faultline than in the unstructured
interaction pattern in a team with a weak faultline.
Summary and Implications
Lau and Murnighan (1998) argued that teams with
strong demographic faultlines are likely to experience
subgroup polarization. We challenged this prediction,
arguing that Lau and Murnighan did not take into
account the important role of demographically criss-
crossing actors in the sensemaking process of teams.
Demographically crisscrossing actors share some demo-
graphic attributes with multiple subgroups and can thus
function as a bridge across the faultline. We showed
that even teams with very strong faultlines comprise at
least a few demographically crisscrossing actors and pro-
posed that even teams with relatively strong faultlines
will eventually overcome polarization even though they
might experience subgroup polarization in the short run.
To underpin this claim, we developed a formal model
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based on the central behavioral assumptions of Lau and
Murnighan’s theory. We conducted computational exper-
iments to test whether the new propositions follow con-
sistently from the behavioral assumptions. Our analyses
confirmed this.
In addition, we found that stronger faultlines imply
opinion polarization only if demographic attributes are
strongly correlated with the opinions of team mem-
bers even before they influence each other and if team
members select interaction partners based on strong
homophily. Finally, contrary to intuition, our simula-
tions revealed that teams with strong faultlines might be
faster in arriving at opinion consensus. We found that
teams with a strong faultline tend to experience sub-
group polarization in the short turn, but once opinions
have converged, these teams relatively quickly find a sta-
ble consensus. Teams with a weaker faultline, on the
other hand, experience less subgroup polarization at the
beginning of the sensemaking process but go through a
longer challenging process (Lau and Murnighan 1998),
where team members question the evolving consensus.
Our analyses confirm that teams with strong fault-
lines experience more subgroup polarization than teams
with weak faultlines. However, if faultlines are not max-
imally strong, as it is often the case in real-world teams,
effects of faultline strength occur only for the short-term
dynamics in a team. In the long run, group splits dis-
appear sooner or later. This appears to be good news
for managers. Nevertheless, we advise readers to inter-
pret our results with caution. The main purpose of our
analysis was to point to hidden implications of the
mechanisms assumed by faultline theory. This does not
preclude that other mechanisms not considered by the
theory may lead to different consequences. Specifically,
our formal model did not consider the possibility that
social identities form around subgroups in the process of
a group split (Rink and Jehn 2010). Members of the sub-
groups may thenA22“act to legitimize the subgroups, and
conflict between them may continue to be likely” (Lau
and Murnighan 1998, p. 333). Strong subgroup identifi-
cation may motivate team members to ignore arguments
that support the opinion that is typical for the oppos-
ing subgroup or refuse interaction with crisscrossing
actors (Abrams et al. 1990). Both would stabilize sub-
group polarization. Identification might also promote the
development of stereotypes about the demographic sub-
groups. Because crisscrossing actors fit into none of the
stereotypes, they may be rejected by members of both
demographic subgroups. If such negativity arises, then
crisscrossing actors will not be able to conciliate.
Despite the possibility that identity formation may
reduce the influence of crisscrossing actors, our results
should not be discarded too readily. We have shown
that integrating effects of crisscrossing actors can in the
long run only be precluded if these actors are perfectly
excluded from the interaction networks within the sub-
groups. Even if subgroup identities form, it seems a
rather extreme assumption that they can entirely prevent
any subgroup influence via crisscrossing actors. It seems
more plausible that the strength of subgroup identities
affects how long it takes until the initial group splits can
be overcome, but not the eventual outcome givenA23that the
team has enough time to converge to a perfect consen-
sus. This also suggests that in the actual practice of work
teams, crisscrossing actors may be important to over-
come the negative effects of faultlines if management
succeeds in creating conditions that support their inte-
grating role. For example, an amicable and friendly envi-
ronment in the work team may be important to reduce
subgroup identifications and may therefore facilitate the
exchange of arguments between the subgroups via criss-
crossing actors (Jehn and Bezrukova 2010).
We recommend that future research on the logical
implications of Lau and Murnighan’s theory addresses
two main areas. First, it would be interesting to investi-
gate model predictions when additional mechanisms that
may foster subgroup polarization, such as social iden-
tification processes, are included (see, e.g., §5 of the
online appendix). This might help to identify conditions
under which teams composed of crisscrossing actors do
not overcome subgroup splits. Similarly, including addi-
tional assumptions about the frequency of interaction
and the duration of argument exchange in a given work
team setting might help to generate testable predictions
about the absolute length of the sensemaking process.
Second, additional tests of robustness of our results
are needed. Sections 4–6 of the online appendix summa-
rize additional analyses that demonstrate robustness of
results against assuming different parameter values and
including alternative assumptions. One topic on which
we focus in particular is the number of salient issues
in the opinion space (K). We made the assumption that
there was only one issue (K = 1) in the analyses of
this paper, but teams may have to consider multiple
opinion issues simultaneously. We expect, however, that
a larger number of opinion issues will not fundamen-
tally affect the dynamics of the model as long as Lau
and Murnighans’ assumption of strong initial congru-
ency is retained. Strong initial congruency implies that
all opinion dimensions are correlated with demographic
characteristics. That is, for larger numbers of opinion
dimensions, strong faultlines will give rise to initial
opinion distributions in which there is a clear align-
ment of the demographic faultline with a group split in
the multidimensional opinion space. From such a start-
ing point, the mechanisms of homophily and argument
exchange should amplify subgroup polarization indepen-
dently of the number of opinion dimensions. This is
consistent with the robustness test that we conducted
for K = 2. At the same time, the number of opin-
ion dimensions should matter once the assumption of
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initial congruency is relaxed. To be more precise, if not
all opinion dimensions are initially aligned with demo-
graphics, it becomes likely that even under a strong
faultline, agents from different demographic subgroups
come to interact, as a result of coincidental opinion sim-
ilarities. The more opinion dimensions there are, the
more there is some degree of opinion similarity between
any two randomly chosen agents, and thus, the less we
should see emergent polarization, all other things being
equal. The online appendix contains more details on how
different results are obtained when the assumption of
strong congruency is relaxed.
The potential of coincidental opinion similarities to
overcome demographic faultlines highlights a further
direction for future research. Crisscrossing between sub-
groups may not only occur in demographic space, but it
may also arise in opinion space. That is, even when a
group falls apart in demographic subgroups, some actors
may hold opinions, or develop them in the course of
interaction, that give them sufficient overlap with mem-
bers in each of the subgroups to communicate arguments
in both directions. We have not explored this possibility
systematically in our current analysis because we wanted
to adhere as closely as possible to the original focus
of Lau and Murnighan’s theory, which is mainly on
the role of demographic faultlines. However, the mech-
anisms of our model suggest that the presence of actors
with crisscrossing opinions could have a similar integrat-
ing effect as demographic crisscrossing. The challenge
is to identify conditions under which this could happen.
Other than demographic features, opinions change in the
course of interaction, and thus opinion crisscrossing is
prone to beA24unstable. However, in a complex dynamic
process, the increased likelihood of between-group inter-
action that opinion crisscrossing can bring about may be
just the “push” that is needed to navigate the dynamic
away from a state of stable polarization toward a state
of consensus between the subgroups.
Our formal analysis of Lau and Murnighan’s faultline
theory illustrates that the method of agent-based mod-
eling allows explicating complex theories and studying
their implications over a wide range of conditions. How-
ever, agent-based simulation modeling can never explore
the entire parameter space of a model, and therefore
it does not allow proving robustness of results for all
possible values of a given parameter, an endeavor that
requires analytical approaches. However, considering
the nonlinearity of central model mechanisms and the
impact of randomness in our formalization, analytical
modeling would presumably require making much more
restrictive assumptions and developing more abstract
models. It is a challenge for future research to explore
whether analytical approximations are feasible without
sacrificing substantively essential features of the model
proposed.
This paper revealed that short-term consequences of
group dynamics might crucially differ from their effects
in the long run. Other research has also proposed effects
of time on consequences of demographic diversity in
work groups. Most prominently, Harrison et al. (2002)
argued that as team members get to know each other, the
relevance of surface-level (demographic) characteristics
will diminish, and members will base selection of inter-
action partners more on psychological similarity (per-
sonality, values, attitudes, beliefs). Like our reasoning,
their argument suggests that the impact of demographic
diversity and thus of demographic faultlines declines
over time (see also Pelled et al. 1999). Surprisingly, our
analyses have shown that this effect follows already from
the elementary behavioral assumptions of faultline the-
ory, without the need to necessarily include additional
mechanisms such as the distinction between surface
similarity and psychological similarity. This unexpected
finding illustrates that already relatively simple models
of social processes can be too complex to grasp their log-
ical consequences by informal reasoning. Formal meth-
ods, therefore, are useful to study such complex systems
and to reveal unexpected consequences of theories that
may remain otherwise undiscovered.
Electronic Companion
An electronic companion to this paper is available as part of
the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1120.0767.
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